The IPCC recommends the use of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technologies in order to achieve the Kyoto environmental goals. This paper sheds light on this issue by assessing the optimal strategy regarding the longterm use of CCS technologies. The aim is to analyze the optimal CCS policy when the sequestration rate is endogenous, being therefore one specific tool of the environmental policy. We develop a simple growth model to identify the main driving forces that should determine the optimal CCS policy. We show that, under some conditions on the cost of extractions, CCS may be a long-term solution to curb carbon emissions. We also show that over time the social planner will choose to decrease the rate of capture and sequestration. We then derive the decentralized equilibrium outcome by considering the programs of the fossil resource-holder and of the representative consumer. Finally, we determine the optimal environmental policy, i.e. the carbon tax scheme, as well as the dynamics of the fossil fuel price needed to implement it.
Introduction
The IPCC's report [19] recommends the development and the use of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technologies in order to achieve the environmental goals imposed by the Kyoto Protocol. CCS is a geoengineering technique for the long-term storage 1 of carbon dioxide or other forms of carbon. Carbon dioxide is usually captured from the atmosphere through biological, chemical or physical processes. CO2 may be captured as a pure by-product in processes related to petroleum refining or from flue gases from power generation. The carbon dioxide might then be permanently stored away from the atmosphere. It has been argued that CCS applied to a conventional power plant could reduce CO 2 emissions in the atmosphere by approximately 80-90% compared to a plant without CCS. The IPCC estimates that the economic potential of CCS could be between 10% and 55% of the total carbon mitigation effort until year 2100 (IPCC [19] ). Despite the lack of certainty about the long-term economic efficiency of the CCS, many countries have already launched some experiments, which are still proceeding. For instance, three important industrialscale storage projects are in operation: Sleipner is the oldest project and is located in the North Sea (Finland); the Weyburn-Midale CO 2 Project is currently the world's largest carbon capture and sequestration project (Canada); the site of In Salah (Algeria) is a natural gas reservoir located in In Salah.
The aim of this paper is to study the optimal carbon capture and sequestration policy. We therefore analyze what the CCS policy should be in a deterministic world. 2 The CCS technologies have inspired a number of empirical studies, via complex integrated assessment models (see McFarland et al. [23] , Edmonds et al. [9] , Kurosawa [20] , Gitz et al. [12] , Edenhofer et al. [8] , Gerlagh [10] , Gerlagh and van der Zwaan [11] , Grimaud et al. [15] ). These papers consider that the existing technology would allow a constant fraction of carbon emissions to be sequestrated. They generally conclude that the early introduction of sequestration would lead to a substantial decrease in the cost of environmental externality. A high level of complexity for such operational models, aimed at defining some specific climate policy, may be required so as to take into account the various interactions involved.
However, in this paper, we consider a stylized model so as to identify the main driving forces that should determine the optimal CCS policy, in a very simple economy. While a generic abatement option can take several forms, such as sequestration by forests or pollution reduction at the source, in this paper we are mainly concerned with the rate of carbon capture and sequestration, although we also introduce the limited size and access costs of the reservoir. Thus, and by contrast to these previous models, we do not consider the optimal level of carbon emissions to capture and store to achieve a given goal, but we conclude with an analytical value of the instantaneous rate of capture and sequestration, that is, the optimal rate of storage.
Following Hotteling [18] , Dasgupta and Heal [7] and Hartwick [16] who analyze the optimal use (i.e. exploitation and/or depletion) of environmental resources, 3 we consider the optimal growth path of an economy facing a dilemma of consumption vs. pollution. The framework introduced in this paper, the Ramsey model, is quite similar to the one used in the papers dealing with optimal pollution control (van der Ploeg and Withagen [25] , Gradus and Smulders [13] , Ayong Le Kama [2] , Ayong Le Kama and Schubert [4] , [5] ). Lafforgue et al. ([21] , [22] ) and Ragot and Schubert [24] have already studied the theoretical consequences of the CCS for some specific cases.
Lafforgue et al. ([21] , [22] ) consider the energy substitution issues when the economy faces a ceiling on the stock of pollution in the atmosphere. Their work is an extension of the ceiling model developed by Chakravorty et al. [6] in which the general abatement technology is replaced by 2 One direct extension, among others, is to take into account the uncertainty linked to CSS efficiency. The CSS projects in action are still recent and we do not know exactly the full consequences of such abatement technologies, in terms of environmental consequences (on oceans for instance), or in terms of efficiency once we consider the leakage problems. 3 See for example Heal [17] for a survey on these topics. a specific CCS device with carbon sinks of limited capacity. Ragot and Schubert ([24] ) analyze the temporality of sequestration in agricultural soils by considering the asymmetric dynamic process. Finally, Grimaud and Rouge [14] study the implications of the CCS technology availability on the optimal use of polluting exhaustible resources and on optimal climate policies, within an endogenous growth framework. They conclude that CCS is detrimental to output growth. But these papers do not consider the CCS technology as a particular tool for the environmental policy. Moreover, in these papers, the rate of change of the stock of pollution or of the stock of the environmental resource, that is, the natural rate of absorption/regeneration, is given. The framework introduced here is different since we determine endogenously the optimal rate of carbon sequestration, as if the rate of change of the stock of pollution were endogenous. This framework originates from Ayong Le Kama and Fodha [3] who have studied the optimal rate of nuclear waste storage, but in a partial equilibrium case.
The sketch of the model is the following. We consider an economy with only one good which is fossil energy fuel. This good comes from the extraction of a non-renewable and given resource stock. Its consumption generates environmental damage due to the release of carbon flows into the atmosphere. For simplification, we assume that the flows of carbon are proportional to the level of consumption. Consumption and pollution enter in a separable way into the utility function. We also assume that the social planner can capture and store a part of the carbon flow in some appropriately deep sinks. Hence, the social planner's goal is to choose the optimal CCS rate policy. We show that, under some conditions on the cost of extractions, CCS may be a long-term solution to curb carbon emissions. We then derive the decentralized equilibrium outcome by considering the programs of the fossil resource-holder and of the representative consumer. Finally, we determine the environmental policy, i.e. the carbon tax scheme, as well as the dynamics of the fossil fuel price that would implement the optimum.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 characterizes the optimal trajectories of the fossil resource extraction and the sequestration. Section 4 derives the decentralized equilibrium outcome and characterizes the carbon tax trajectory that would implement the optimum. The last section concludes.
The Model
Let us consider an economy in which, at each date t, the unique consumption good is a flow of fossil energy fuel x t . This good exhibits two main properties. First, it comes from the extraction of a non-renewable and initially given resource stock X 0 . The current fossil resource stock X t thus evolves over time as follows:
We denote by c the full marginal delivery cost of the fossil fuel, which includes the extraction cost of the resource, the cost of industrial processing (refining) and the transportation cost, so that the resource is ready for use by the consumer. For simplicity, the marginal cost is set to be constant and positive. Secondly, the consumption of fossil energy provides utility but it also generates some environmental damage due to the release of carbon emissions into the atmosphere coming from the combustion of the fossil fuel. For simplicity, we assume additive separability between utility and damage (i.e. marginal utility is not impacted by pollution). We denote by u(x t ) the instantaneous flow of utility provided by the consumption of x t units of fossil energy, assumed to have the standard properties (increasing, concave, Inada). We use the following Constant Elasticity of Substitution form:
, where the elasticity of the marginal utility, , is constant and strictly positive.
The instantaneous flow of damage v(P t ) associated with the atmospheric carbon stock P t is taken as a linear function:
We also assume that utility and damage flows are expressed in monetary terms, so that u(x t ) − vP t can be viewed as the consumer's gross surplus.
The unitary carbon content of fossil fuel is denoted by β so that, without any abatement at the source of pollution, the instantaneous carbon emissions would be βx t . We assume that a CCS device is available from the initial date and we denote by γ t the rate of sequestration, i.e. the proportion of carbon emissions that is captured and stored in geological reservoirs. The instantaneous flow of carbon sequestration is then equal to s t = γ t βx t and the dynamics of storage is given by:
where S t is the accumulated quantity of carbon stored in a carbon sink. We also assume that the maximum amount of carbon that can be captured and stored is limited by the physical capacityS of the geological reservoirs:
To justify this assumption, we can argue that carbon emissions are mainly stockpiled in empty geological deposits, such as oil sinks or gas fields, and those potential reservoirs are themselves available in finite quantities. CCS is costly and we assume that the sequestration cost D(γ t , x t ) depends both on the level of emissions and the rate of sequestration. 4 Finally the atmospheric carbon accumulation process is described by the following dynamic constraint: (4) where (1 − γ t )βx t measures the level of carbon emissions net of abatement and α denotes the natural rate of decay of the atmosphere.
The Optimal Extraction and CCS Paths

Optimal Program and First-order Conditions
The program of the social planner consists in choosing a fossil fuel consumption profile {x t } t≥0 and a sequestration rate trajectory {γ t } t≥0 that maximize the sum of the discounted net current surplus:
subject to constraints (1)-(4) and to the following nonnegativity constraints:
We denote by ρ the social rate of discount.
Here we make several points before solving this optimal program. As usually done, we do not consider the nonnegativity constraints on the state variables. From the Inada conditions, the non-negativity constraint on x t will never be binding, except asymptotically, so we do not consider it either. Finally, we examine the case where the economy is not constrained by Eq. (7) and we will check this condition ex-post.
The corresponding Hamiltonian in current value writes:
where λ t , μ t , η t are the co-state variables associated with state Eqs. (1), (2) and (4) respectively. Those variables read respectively as the scarcity rent of the fossil resource, the implicit (social) marginal value of carbon capture and storage, the implicit (social) marginal cost of releasing carbon into the atmosphere. Intuitively, along any optimal path, we may obtain non-negative values for λ t and non-positive values for μ t and η t . Moreover, ξ t denotes the marginal cost of sequestration coming from a tightening in the limited reservoir capacity constraint, formally the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (3). The first-order conditions are:
The complementary slackness condition and the transversality conditions are: 
Equation (8) equates the marginal utility of consuming one unit of fossil energy to its full marginal cost. This marginal cost can be broken down into: i) the marginal extraction cost c, ii) the resource scarcity rent λ t , iii) the full cost of sequestration β[d(γ t ) − γ t μ t ] by unit of fossil fuel use, and iv) the marginal social cost of augmenting the atmospheric carbon stock by the flow of residual emissions, i.e. by (1 − γ t )βη t . Equation (9) says that the full marginal cost of carbon burying (left-hand-side) must be equal to its social marginal gain in terms of atmospheric carbon concentration reduction (right-hand side). Equation (10) is none other than the Hotelling rule, explicitly λ t = λ 0 e ρt . Furthermore, condition (14) implies that if the fossil resource stock has some positive initial value λ 0 > 0, then it must be exhausted asymptotically. Equation (11) states that the implicit marginal value of CCS must grow at the pure rate of time preferences ρ, augmented by ξ t which reflects the limited capacity of carbon sinks. Note that, from Eq. (13), this last term is nil as long as the reservoir is not filled and non-negative otherwise, which means that μ t also obeys the Hotelling rule only during the phase when CCS is active. Finally, Eq. (12) says that the social marginal cost of atmospheric carbon accumulation must grow at a rate equal to the sum of the social rate of discount augmented by the natural rate of decay, 5 and the marginal damage.
Finally, note that replacing (μ − η) by d (γ ) from Eq. (9), the first-order condition (8) can be rewritten as:
The next section characterizes the analytical expression of the optimal trajectories.
Optimal Trajectories
First, we solve the non-homogeneous differential Eq. (12) by using the associated transversality condition (16) in order to identify the initial value η 0 . For any t, the solution is given by (star in exponent refers here to optimality):
which is clearly negative. The social marginal cost of emitting at time t one unit of carbon is equal to the discounted sum of the instantaneous marginal damage, from t up to ∞. Note that assuming constant marginal damage and exponential discounting leads to a net present value of future damage which is constant. Next we derive the same procedure to determine μ t which, from Eqs. (11) and (15), results as:
Since ξ t ≥ 0 from Eq. (13), μ * t is non-positive for any t. The social marginal cost of sequestration (by unit of carbon emitted) is equal to the discounted sum over time of the instantaneous costs of the reservoir capacity constraint, from t up to ∞.
To solve the social planner's program at the end, we need to find the optimal expression of ξ t . Let us assume that the carbon reservoir is filled at a finite timet << ∞. We will discuss an eventual asymptotic filling up of the reservoir later. Obviously,t is defined such that St =S and thus depends on the sizeS of the reservoir. For any date t ≥t, we haveṠ t = 0, which implies γ t βx t = 0. From the Inada condition on u(.), x is never nil, except asymptotically, and then we must have γ t = 0 for any t ≥t. Since, in that case, Eq. (9) writes d (0) = μ t − η t , we must also haveμ t −η t = 0. From Eqs. (11) and (12), we thus obtain ξ t = αη t + v − ρd (0), which, by using Eq. (18), implies:
Recall that ξ * t reads as the optimal social value of the limited capacity constraint of carbon reservoirs or, in other words, as the marginal increase of social welfare coming from a marginal increase ofS. It is equal to zero as long as the reservoir is not filled, and it takes some positive value thereafter. Moreover, from the non-negativity constraint (13), we must impose the following condition:
which states that it is optimal to fill up the carbon sink in finite time if and only if the net present value of future damage is larger than the initial marginal sequestration cost in order to provide enough incentives for a CCS deployment. Given that d (0) = 1, condition ( 21) implies that the instantaneous marginal damage v must be larger than the "modified" social discount rate ρ + α. Replacing into Eq. (19) ξ * t by its expression coming from Eq. (20), expanding computations and simplifying, we obtain:
The implicit marginal CCS cost μ * t is increasing over time for t <t, and constant after. Moreover, the continuity condition at the time at which the carbon reservoir is filled is satisfied.
Next, we determine the optimal trajectories of the two control variables x t and γ t . We start with γ t which, from Eq. (9), can be written as γ t = (μ t − η t − 1)/κ. Replacing μ t and η t by their expressions coming respectively from Eqs. (18) and (22) , and noting that d (0) = 1, we obtain:
where the initial value of γ * t is given by:
To determine the optimal trajectory of x t , we come back to Eq. (17) which can be rewritten as:
Given (23), we finally get:
and then, the initial energy consumption level is:
All these findings are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.
The optimal sequestration rate and the optimal energy consumption γ * t , x * t are characterized by:
where the couple of variables t, λ * 0 is determined by the following system of equations:
namely, the asymptotic resource exhaustion constraint and the continuity equation att of the cumulated sequestration.
Those solutions are illustrated in Figure 1 . Sinceγ = − ρ κ v ρ+α − 1 e −ρ(t−t) < 0, the optimal sequestration rate starts from its initial value γ * 0 as defined by Eq. (24), and declines over time down to 0, as shown in the top right quadrant of Figure 1 . The top left quadrant shows the optimal fossil energy as a function of the optimal sequestration rate. From Eq. (28), for any t <t, Eq. (29) can be rewritten as:
that is, as an optimal energy consumption policy function depending only on the sequestration rate (and no longer directly on time). It is easy to verify that such a function is increasing and convex in γ * .
The bottom left quadrant is a purely technical device to show how the energy consumption is derived from the sequestration rate at any point of time. The resulting trajectory is finally depicted in the bottom right quadrant of Figure 1 . We thus obtain an optimal energy consumption path which is continuous and declining over time, but which exhibits a kink at t =t (i.e. its slope is discontinuous at this point of time). Note that, for any t ≥t, the last part of the optimal trajectory is characterized by Eq. (29) when γ * t = 0.
Let us now check the existence conditions of the optimal solutions mentioned in Proposition 1. First, a direct implication of ξ * t ≥ 0 is that γ * t ≥ 0 for any t. Secondly, a necessary and sufficient condition for having γ * t smaller than 1 is γ * 0 ≤ 1 since the sequestration rate decreases over time. Such a condition leads to:
Condition (33) also provides some insights about the value oft. If v > (ρ + α)(κ + 1), Eq. (33) guarantees that the carbon reservoir will be filled in finite time. Otherwise,t could be finite as well as infinite. Finally, we have x * t ≥ 0 for any t ≥t and x * t > 0, which ensures that x * t > 0 for any t <t since x * t is monotonically decreasing over time. Table 1 summarizes these findings. We can observe that the greater the marginal damage v, the stronger the incentive to capture carbon emissions and the sooner the capacity constraint of the reservoir will be reached.
Last, note that the optimal path characterized above strongly depends upon the way the climatic damages have been defined. We have assumed that those damage are represented by an increasing and continuous function depending on the current level of the pollution stock. An alternative approach would be to consider that damage are negligible as long as the atmospheric carbon concentration stays below some critical threshold, and they become incommensurably high if this threshold is overshot. Denoting byP this ceiling, the corresponding damage function would be such that v (P t ) = 0 for P t ≤P and v (P t ) = +∞ for P t >P .
The definition of such a threshold thus leads to an associated support climatic policy that takes the form of a quantity-based policy, or a carbon cap as it is aimed by the Kyoto Protocol for instance. 6 Formally, this consists in considering the following constraint on the stock of pollution: P t ≤P , with P 0 <P . In the case whereP is small enough and/or X 0 is large enough, it is clear that the ceiling must be reached in finite time thus implying three successive phases (see Chakravorty et al. [6] ): a pre-ceiling phase during which P t <P andṖ t > 0; a ceiling phase during which P t =P and the net carbon emissions are constant and equal to αP , which constrains the fossil resource use; a post-ceiling phase during which the ceiling is not constraining anymore, P t <P , andṖ t < 0 since the fossil resource is extracted at a decreasing rate until full exhaustion.
Lafforgue et al. [21] determine the optimal carbon sequestration path under such a ceiling constraint, assuming that the command variable is the sequestration flow and that the marginal abatement cost is constant. They conclude that it is optimal to begin sequestration only once the ceiling is reached in order to relax the constraint on the fossil fuel use and that carbon sequestration declines through time until the carbon sink is filled. Amigues et al. [1] extend this model by considering a flow-dependent and increasing marginal cost function of abatement. They show that, under this assumption, optimal abatement must begin during the pre-ceiling phase. In this case, carbon sequestration allows both to delay the time at which the ceiling constraint begins to be effective and to relax this constraint once effective. Moreover the optimal sequestration flow must be first increasing during the pre-ceiling phase and next decreasing during the ceiling phase.
However, these last results are obtained by considering the sequestration flow as the control. It can be easily shown that they remain valid when the command variable is the sequestration rate. The only difference is that sequestration must begin at the initial time of the planning horizon.
Decentralization of the Economy and Implementation of the Optimum
In this section, we decentralize the economy which have been studied above by considering the individual programs of the fossil resource-holder and of the consumer. We assume perfect competitive markets and we denote by p t and r t the fossil fuel price 7 and the real interest rate on financial markets, respectively. In order to correct the environmental externality, we introduce a carbon tax τ t . Note that, due to the CCS device, the tax applies to the sole part of carbon emissions which are effectively released into the atmosphere after sequestration. In that sense, carbon taxation is disconnected from the fossil resource use.
Equilibrium Trajectories
The resource-holder chooses the extraction path {x t } ∞ t=0 that maximizes the discounted sum over time of their current profits
0 r s ds dt subject to constraint (1) . First-order conditions imply:
which is none other than the standard Hotelling rule with a constant marginal extraction cost, and which states that the resource rent must grow at the rate of interest. Solving this differential equation, we get:
where the initial fossil resource price level p 0 is such that the transversality condition lim t↑∞ X t = 0 is satisfied. The program of the energy user consists in choosing the consumption and sequestration rate trajectories {x t } ∞ t=0 and {γ t } ∞ t=0 that maximize (3) and (7). 8 As in the previous section, we examine the case 7 As suggested by a referee, one would expect a sequentiality of decisions between resource holder and resource users. Doing so, we would assume that firstly, the resource holder could choose the level of extraction; secondly, the resource user could decide the consumption and the sequestration rates. This is an interesting extension that would require to change the framework and would complicate significantly the calculus. 8 Note that we conduct here a partial decentralization exercise since the behavior of agents on the financial market, which would allow us to determine the equilibrium level of the interest rate, is not examined. It is possible to introduce the budget constraint of the consumer who can save money and hold a stock of bonds B t . In its simplest form, this constraint writesḂ t = rB t − p t x t − βx t d(γ t ) − τ t (1 − γ t )βx t . However, it can be easily proved that this additional feature changes neither the properties of the equilibrium trajectories nor the optimum implementation rules.
where the decision-maker is not constrained by Eq. (7). The first-order conditions are: (38) where, by analogy with the optimal program, μ e t and ξ e t are, respectively, the multipliers associated with constraints (2) and (3), but now expressed at the equilibrium. Hence the same type of complementary slackness and transversality conditions as (13) and (15) apply. Formally, we proceed similarly as with the optimal program to determine the sequestration trajectory and we denote byt e , provided that it is finite, the date at which the capacityS of the carbon sink is saturated. For t <t e , ξ e t = 0 and for t ≥t e , the sequestration rate γ must be equal to zero. Given Eqs. (37) and (38) 
Implementation of the Optimum
By analogy between Proposition 1 that characterizes the optimal paths and Proposition 2 that describes the equilibrium outcome, we can determine the carbon tax trajectory and the system of prices that would implement the social optimum. Proposition 3 below states this implementation.
Proposition 3.
The optimal environmental policy and the associated interest rate and fossil fuel price are given by:
where λ * 0 is such that
Due to the specific functional forms introduced above, in particular the assumption of a constant marginal damage of pollution, the optimal carbon tax is constant over time. In a more general framework, this optimal carbon price would be in fact equal at any time t to the sum from t up to ∞ of the future marginal damage involved by the emission at time t of one unit of carbon, discounted at the modified discount rate (ρ + α) in order to take into account that carbon is naturally absorbed into the atmosphere at rate α by unit of time.
Finally, note that we have opted for one kind of decentralization of the economy. Another decentralization option would be to consider that the representative energy user directly consumes final energy services and that the CCS deployment is undertaken by the fossil resource-holder (now the energy sector). This last sector also bears the carbon tax burden so that its program becomes: max The consumer intertemporal simple calculus gives u (x t ) = p t and it is easy to verify that Proposition 3 remains valid. The same observation applies in the case where the budget constraint of the consumer,Ḃ t = rB t − p t x t , is also taken into account. These different cases shed light on the robustness of our results with respect to the budget constraints of the households and to the tax base. Hence, whatever the tax base and the intertemporal budget constraint, the optimal value of the tax remains the same, simply because the environmental externalities and the distortions are also unchanged.
Conclusion
Following the IPCC's report [19] , which recommended the development and the use of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technologies in order to achieve the environmental goals defined by the Kyoto Protocol, the issue we have addressed in this paper concerns the optimal strategy regarding the long-term use of carbon capture and sequestration technologies.
The aim of this paper was to study the optimal carbon capture and sequestration policy. We then tried to analyze what the optimal CCS policy should be in a deterministic world. We have shown within this simple model that, under some conditions on the cost of extractions, CCS may be a long-term solution for the carbon emissions problem. It is also shown that the social planner will optimally choose to decrease the rate of capture and sequestration. We have also introduced a decentralized economy by considering the individual program of the fossil resource-holder and that of the representative consumer. This helped us to compute analytically the optimal environmental policy, that is, the optimal tax scheme, and also the optimal fossil fuel price profile.
However, all these results are obtained in a deterministic world. One direct and natural extension of the model, among others, might be to take into account the uncertainty linked to CCS efficiency. The CCS technologies in action are still recent and we do not know exactly the full consequences of such abatement technologies, in terms of environmental consequences (on oceans for instance), or in terms of efficiency once we consider the leakage problems.
